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a b s t r a c t 
We test the relation between ambiguity aversion and ﬁve household portfolio choice puz- 
zles: nonparticipation in equities, low allocations to equity, home-bias, own-company stock 
ownership, and portfolio under-diversiﬁcation. In a representative US household survey, we 
measure ambiguity preferences using custom-designed questions based on Ellsberg urns. 
As theory predicts, ambiguity aversion is negatively associated with stock market partic- 
ipation, the fraction of ﬁnancial assets in stocks, and foreign stock ownership, but it is 
positively related to own-company stock ownership. Conditional on stock ownership, am- 
biguity aversion is related to portfolio under-diversiﬁcation, and during the ﬁnancial crisis, 
ambiguity-averse respondents were more likely to sell stocks. 
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2 These papers model ambiguity aversion using the multiple prior 
model of Gilboa (1987), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , and Schmeidler 1. Introduction 
Households must consider both risk and ambiguity 
when making investment decisions. Risk refers to events 
for which the probabilities of the future outcomes are 
known. Ambiguity refers to events for which the probabil- 
ities of the future outcomes are unknown. Ellsberg (1961) 
argues that most people are ambiguity-averse, that is, they 
prefer a lottery with known probabilities to a similar lot- 
tery with unknown probabilities, and numerous theoretical 
studies explore the implications of ambiguity for economic 
behavior. A large body of theory suggests that ambigu- 
ity aversion can explain several household portfolio choice 
puzzles. 1 Empirical tests for some of these theoretical ex- 
planations, however, derive mainly from laboratory exper- 
iments instead of actual portfolio choices. In other cases, 
the proposed theoretical explanations have not been em- 
pirically tested. 
In this paper, we provide non-laboratory empirical 
evidence that ambiguity aversion relates to ﬁve household 
portfolio choice puzzles: nonparticipation in equity mar- 
kets, low portfolio fractions allocated to equity, home-bias, 
own-company stock ownership, and portfolio under- 
diversiﬁcation. In a nationally representative sample of 
US households, we use real rewards to elicit measures 
of individuals’ ambiguity aversion and then demonstrate 
that these measures can explain actual portfolio choices. 
As theory predicts, ambiguity aversion is negatively as- 
sociated with stock market participation, the fraction 
of ﬁnancial assets allocated to stocks, and foreign stock 
ownership, but ambiguity aversion is positively related to 
own-company stock ownership. Conditional on stock own- 
ership, ambiguity aversion also helps to explain portfolio 
under-diversiﬁcation. 
We have developed a purpose-built internet survey 
module designed to elicit ambiguity aversion and ﬁelded 
it on more than three thousand respondents in the Amer- 
ican Life Panel (ALP). Following the classic Ellsberg urn 
problem, our module asks respondents to choose be- 
tween a lottery with known probabilities (the drawing 
of a ball from a box with 100 colored balls in known 
proportions) versus a lottery with unknown probabilities. 
We vary the proportions of colored balls in the lottery 
with known probabilities, so as to measure individual re- 
spondents’ ambiguity aversion. All respondents were el- 
igible to win real monetary incentives (we paid a total 
of $23,850 to 1,590 of the 3,258 respondents), because 
previous studies show that rewards are crucial for elicit- 
ing meaningful responses to questions involving economic 
preferences. 
Our results conﬁrm prior laboratory studies ﬁnding 
large heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion; that is, a sub- 
stantial fraction of our respondents is ambiguity-averse 
(52%); a small fraction ambiguity-neutral (10%); and the 
remainder ambiguity-seeking (38%). We ﬁnd little to no 
correlation between our ambiguity measure and several 1 For example, see Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, and Zame 
(2010), Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005), Dow and Werlang (1992), Easley 
and O’Hara (2009), Epstein and Schneider (2010), Garlappi, Uppal, and 
Wang (2007) , and Peijnenburg (2014) , among others. proxies for probability naiveté, thereby providing evidence 
that our measure reﬂects preferences, not mistakes. Having 
elicited ambiguity aversion, we then test whether it can 
help explain household portfolio choice puzzles. 
A large proportion of the US population does not par- 
ticipate in the stock market, which is puzzling given that 
theoretical models using standard expected utility func- 
tions predict that all individuals will do so ( Merton, 1969 ). 
For those who do participate, theory predicts they will 
allocate a counterfactually high fraction of assets to eq- 
uity ( Heaton and Lucas, 1997 ). Several theoretical papers 
suggest that ambiguity aversion can explain these puz- 
zles, based on the assumption that investors view stock 
returns as ambiguous. Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, 
and Zame (2010), Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005), Dow and 
Werlang (1992), Easley and O’Hara (2009) , and Epstein 
and Schneider (2010) , among others, show that ambigu- 
ity aversion can cause nonparticipation. 2 Garlappi, Uppal, 
and Wang (2007) and Peijnenburg (2014) show that am- 
biguity aversion can reduce the fraction of ﬁnancial assets 
allocated to equity. 
We test the predictions of these theoretical models and 
ﬁnd that ambiguity aversion has a signiﬁcant negative re- 
lation with both stock market participation and portfolio 
allocations to equity. Results indicate that a one standard 
deviation increase in ambiguity aversion implies a 2.0 per- 
centage point decrease in the probability of stock market 
participation (8.6% relative to the baseline rate of 23%) and 
a 4.0 percentage point decrease in the fraction of ﬁnan- 
cial assets allocated to equity (7.8% relative to the condi- 
tional average allocation of 51.4%). The results are robust 
to controlling for numerous variables that previous studies 
suggest could affect household portfolio choices, including 
wealth, income, age, education, risk aversion, trust, and ﬁ- 
nancial literacy. The module also includes two check ques- 
tions to assess whether a respondent’s choices are con- 
sistent. We ﬁnd stronger results for respondents whose 
choices are consistent. 
In addition to explaining participation in and allo- 
cations to equities as a broad asset class, theory sug- 
gests that ambiguity aversion can help explain portfo- 
lio puzzles related to particular categories of equity: the 
home-bias and own-company stock puzzles. The home- 
bias puzzle refers to the fact that households heavily over- 
weight domestic equity relative to mean-variance bench- 
marks ( French and Poterba, 1991 ). The own-company stock 
puzzle refers to the fact that households voluntarily hold 
signiﬁcant amounts of their employers’ stock ( Benartzi, 
20 01; Meulbrook, 20 05; Mitchell and Utkus, 2003 ). Sev- 
eral theoretical papers argue that ambiguity aversion can 
explain these puzzles, because, relative to the domestic 
stock market, foreign stocks are relatively ambiguous and (1989) . Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, and Zame (2010) use an ex- 
tension of the multiple prior model, the α-MaxMin model of Ghirardato, 
Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) , which distinguishes between prefer- 
ences toward ambiguity and beliefs about the level of ambiguity. In this 
paper, we take no stand on the correct underlying model of ambiguity. 
Our measure of ambiguity aversion is valid under all commonly used 
models. 
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 own-company stock is relatively unambiguous (e.g., Boyle,
Uppal, and Wang, 2003; Boyle, Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang,
2012; Cao, Han, Hirshleifer, and Zhang, 2011; Epstein and
Miao, 2003; Uppal and Wang, 2003 ). Thus, the portfolio of
an ambiguity-averse investor is biased away from foreign
stocks but toward own-company stock. To our knowledge,
we are the ﬁrst to empirically test these predictions. 
We ﬁnd evidence consistent with both predictions.
Ambiguity aversion is negatively related to foreign stock
ownership, but positively related to own-company stock
ownership. This pattern holds both in the overall sample
and within the subset of equity holders. The results for eq-
uity owners are of particular interest, as they demonstrate
that ambiguity aversion helps to explain the composition
of equity portfolios and not only the participation decision.
Our results also provide evidence that ambiguity aversion
is not simply a proxy for risk aversion, because, for foreign
and own-company stock ownership, the theoretical effect
of risk aversion is exactly opposite to that of ambiguity
aversion. 
The paper also tests the Heath and Tversky (1991) com-
petence hypothesis, which predicts that the effect of am-
biguity aversion depends on individuals’ domain-speciﬁc
knowledge. Although people are generally ambiguity-
averse toward tasks for which they do not feel competent
(e.g., guessing the composition of an Ellsberg urn), they are
much less ambiguity-averse toward tasks for which they
believe they have expertise. Hence, we expect that higher
stock market competence will moderate the relation be-
tween a respondent’s ambiguity aversion toward Ellsberg
urns and his ambiguity aversion toward stock investments.
We measure stock market competence in two ways: self-
assessed stock market knowledge and ﬁnancial literacy. For
both measures, we ﬁnd that the negative effect of am-
biguity aversion on stock market participation is stronger
for people with lower stock market competence, consistent
with the implications of the competence hypothesis. 
Furthermore, theory suggests that ambiguity aversion
relates to portfolio under-diversiﬁcation, with the effect of
ambiguity aversion depending on the relative ambiguity of
the overall market compared with individual stocks. Boyle,
Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang (2012) ﬁnd that an agent who
views the overall stock market as highly ambiguous, rela-
tive to some limited number of familiar individual stocks,
will invest in the individual stocks, thereby holding an
under-diversiﬁed portfolio. Consistent with this hypothesis,
we ﬁnd that, conditional on participation, the fraction of
the portfolio allocated to individual stocks is increasing in
ambiguity aversion for individuals with low self-assessed
knowledge about the overall stock market. These individu-
als view the overall stock market as highly ambiguous and
so conditional on participation, they hold only a few indi-
vidual stocks. 
In most models of ambiguity, the effect of ambiguity
aversion is stronger when the perceived level of ambiguity
is high. We therefore also test how equity owners reacted
to the 20 08–20 09 ﬁnancial crisis, a period when the per-
ceived ambiguity of future asset returns increased sharply
(e.g., Bernanke, 2010; Caballero and Simsek, 2013 ). Our re-
sults show that respondents with higher ambiguity aver-
sion were signiﬁcantly more likely to actively sell equi-ties during the crisis. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst
empirical test examining how ambiguity aversion affects
active changes in household portfolios during times of
market turmoil. 
To explore the implied magnitude of our ﬁndings on
asset prices, we calibrate the general equilibrium asset
pricing model by Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, and
Zame (2010) using our survey estimates. Although we
ﬁnd that ambiguity preferences lead to a higher equity
premium, our estimates suggest that heterogeneity miti-
gates the effect of ambiguity aversion on asset prices, as
ambiguity-averse and -seeking agents have opposite de-
mands for securities with uncertain payoffs. 
This paper contributes to the literature by testing the-
oretical models that use ambiguity aversion to explain
household portfolio choice. Aside from a few laboratory
experiments (e.g., Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, and
Zame, 2010 ), we are the ﬁrst to show a signiﬁcant rela-
tion between ambiguity aversion and stock market partici-
pation. Dimmock, Kouwenberg, and Wakker (2015) develop
and apply a method for eliciting ambiguity attitudes in a
Dutch household survey. Their primary focus is to develop
the elicitation method, but they also examine whether am-
biguity aversion is related to stock market participation.
In their relatively small data set, they found no signiﬁ-
cant relation except for a subset of respondents having low
perceived knowledge about future asset returns. Because
this is not their main focus, and because their data set
does not contain the necessary variables, they do not test
any other hypotheses related to household portfolio choice.
Further, their measures of ambiguity attitudes are based
on a particular model of ambiguity, the source method of
Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido, and Wakker (2011) and Chew
and Sagi (2008) , which differs from the models of ambi-
guity used in the ﬁnance literature. Accordingly, the tests
in Dimmock, Kouwenberg, and Wakker (2015) do not align
with the theoretical predictions in the literature. By con-
trast, in the present study, our measure of ambiguity aver-
sion is consistent with the underlying models of prefer-
ences used in the ﬁnance literature. 
Our data set contains detailed information about house-
hold portfolios, allowing us to test a rich set of hypotheses.
Our paper is the ﬁrst non-laboratory analysis to show that
ambiguity aversion can help explain ﬁve household choice
puzzles: equity nonparticipation, the low fraction of assets
allocated to equities, home-bias, own-company stock in-
vestment, and portfolio under-diversiﬁcation. We are also
the ﬁrst to show that ambiguity aversion relates to ac-
tive portfolio changes in response to the ﬁnancial crisis.
Our results are consistent with the predictions of a large
number of theoretical models, and we show that ambigu-
ity aversion can help explain numerous puzzling features
of households’ portfolio choices. 
In what follows, Section 2 describes how we measure
ambiguity aversion in an online survey in which we paid
subjects real rewards based on their choices. Our survey
results are discussed in Section 3 . The next two sections
explore the relationship between ambiguity aversion, stock
holding, home-bias, and own-company stock ownership.
In Section 6 , we examine how ambiguity aversion depends
on investors’ familiarity (or competence) with the stock
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Fig. 1. Choosing between two boxes with purple and orange balls, one having a known (50%) chance of winning and the other ambiguous. This ﬁgure 
shows a screen shot from our American Life Panel module representing the ﬁrst question in the ambiguity elicitation sequence. Box K has a 50% initial 
known probability of winning; Box U has an unknown mix of purple and orange balls. If the respondent selects “Box K,” he is taken to a new question 
with a lower probability of winning in Box K (fewer purple balls). If he selects “Box U,” the next question has a higher winning probability of winning in 
Box K (more purple balls). If the respondent selects “Indifferent,” or after four rounds, the question sequence is complete. 
 market, and how it inﬂuences their portfolio diversiﬁca- 
tion. Section 7 outlines the interaction between investor 
ambiguity aversion and behavior during the 20 08–20 09 
ﬁnancial crisis. In Section 8 we discuss asset pricing 
implications. A ﬁnal section concludes. 
2. Measuring ambiguity aversion 
To elicit ambiguity aversion we designed a special mod- 
ule for the ALP survey (see Online Appendix A). Our ques- 
tions are posed as choices between an ambiguous Box U 
(unknown) and an unambiguous Box K (known), similar to 
the famous Ellsberg (1961) two urn experiment. 3 As shown 
in Fig. 1 , both boxes contain exactly 100 balls, which can 
be purple or orange. The respondent selects one of the 
boxes, and then a ball is randomly drawn from that box. 
He wins $15 if that ball is purple and $0 if the ball is or- 
ange. For Box K, the number of purple balls is explicitly 
stated (50), as well as the number of orange balls (50). 3 Our survey module uses “box” instead of “urn,” as the word “urn”
could be unfamiliar to some subjects. We elicit ambiguity with questions 
about urns, instead of stocks, to avoid biases and reverse causality. For Box U, the number of purple balls is not given, and 
the respondent only knows it is between zero and 100. A 
respondent who prefers Box K over Box U is ambiguity- 
averse; that is, he prefers known probabilities to unknown 
probabilities. 4 In the survey, a respondent can also choose 
“Indifferent” instead of Box K or Box U. A choice of “In- 
different” implies that the respondent considers Box K and 
Box U equally attractive, and so he is ambiguity-neutral. An 
ambiguity-neutral subject treats the subjective probability 
of winning for Box U as if it were equal to the 50% known
probability of winning for Box K. For this reason, we refer 
to 50% as Box U’s ambiguity-neutral probability of winning. 
To more precisely measure respondents’ ambiguity 
aversion, we follow an approach similar to that of Baillon 
and Bleichrodt (2015), Baillon, Cabantous, and Wakker 
(2012) , and Dimmock, Kouwenberg, and Wakker (2015) . 
Our question sequence takes the respondent through 
a series of choices that are conditional on prior answers 
and converge toward the point of indifference. For exam- 
ple, suppose a respondent displays ambiguity aversion in 4 For a formal deﬁnition of ambiguity aversion, see Epstein and Schnei- 
der (2010 , pp. 317–319). 
S.G. Dimmock et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 119 (2016) 559–577 563 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 In August 2013, we ﬁelded an additional survey with 500 respon- 
dents. In this survey, half of the respondents could choose the winning 
color (purple or orange), and the other half could not (all other aspects 
of this survey were identical to the original survey, including real incen- 
tives). The mean matching probabilities of the color choice and no color 
choice groups are 0.479 and 0.459, respectively, and the difference is not the ﬁrst round of the question, preferring Box K over Box U
(see Fig. 1 ). We then decrease Box K’s known probability of
winning to 25% in the second round (see Fig. A2 in Online
Appendix A). Alternatively, if the respondent chooses Box
U in the ﬁrst round, we then increase the known proba-
bility of winning to 75%. This process is repeated for up
to four rounds, until the respondent’s indifference point is
closely approximated. 5 We refer to the known probability
of winning for Box K at which the respondent is indiffer-
ent between Box K and Box U as the matching probabil-
ity ( Wakker, 2010 ). For example, a matching probability of
40% means the respondent is indifferent between drawing
a purple ball from Box K with a known probability of win-
ning equal to 40% versus drawing a purple ball from Box U
with an unknown probability. 
A key appeal of this approach is that matching prob-
abilities measure ambiguity aversion relative to risk aver-
sion, because the alternative to the ambiguous choice is
a risky choice, not a certain outcome. As a result, all
other features of utility such as risk aversion or proba-
bility weighting are differenced out of the comparison, as
risk aversion has an identical effect on the evaluation of
the risky lottery and on the ambiguous lottery. For exam-
ple, different subjects can receive different utilities from
a prize of $15. But our matching probabilities measure a
within-subject comparison between a risky lottery and an
ambiguous lottery and, because the prize is the same for
both boxes, the utility of $15 is differenced out of the com-
parison. Accordingly, cross-subject differences in utility are
irrelevant. Matching probabilities capture only differential
preferences for ambiguity relative to risk. 6 
Because the ambiguity-neutral probability of the am-
biguous lottery is 50%, a respondent with a matching prob-
ability below 50% is ambiguity-averse. A respondent with
a matching probability equal to 50% is ambiguity-neutral,
and a respondent with a matching probability above 50% is
ambiguity-seeking. In what follows, q denotes the match-
ing probability and we deﬁne our key measure as Ambigu-
ity Aversion = 50% − q . Thus, positive values of this measure
indicate ambiguity aversion, zero indicates ambiguity neu-
trality, and negative values indicate ambiguity-seeking. In
some of the empirical tests, we use two additional mea-
sures of ambiguity aversion. The ﬁrst is simply an indica-
tor variable equal to one if the respondent shows ambigu-
ity aversion for the ﬁrst round of the question (i.e., if he
selects Box K in the ﬁrst round). The second is the rank
transformation of the Ambiguity Aversion measure, with
zero indicating the lowest level of ambiguity aversion and
one the highest. 
Importantly, subjects could win real rewards based on
their choices, because prior studies show that offering such
rewards produces more reliable estimates of preferences
( Smith, 1976 ). The instructions at the start of the sur-
vey told the subjects that one of their choices would be
randomly selected and played for a chance to win $15.
We paid a total of $23,850 in real incentives to 1,590 of5 Online Appendix A provides additional details about the approxima- 
tion method. 
6 For a formal proof, see Theorem 5.1 of Dimmock, Kouwenberg, and 
Wakker (2015) . the 3,258 ALP subjects. The RAND Corporation’s ALP was
responsible for determining the incentives won by respon-
dents and making payments. Accordingly, suspicion about
the trustworthiness of the incentive scheme should play no
role, as subjects regularly participate in ALP surveys and
receive incentive payments from RAND. 
In Ellsberg experiments, respondents can usually choose
the winning color, to rule out potential suspicion that the
ambiguous urn is manipulated to contain fewer purple
balls than orange balls. In our survey, we elected not to
add an option to change the winning color, as we sought
to keep the survey as simple as possible for use in the gen-
eral population. Further, the survey was administered by
RAND Corporation’s ALP, which should minimize distrust.
Prior studies have also demonstrated overwhelmingly that
subjects are indifferent between betting on either color
(e.g., Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido, and Wakker, 2011; Fox
and Tversky, 1998 ). To conﬁrm this, we gave a separate
group of 250 respondents the option to select the win-
ning color and found no signiﬁcant differences in ambigu-
ity aversion from the main survey sample. 7 
Because elicited preferences likely contain measure-
ment error (see Harless and Camerer, 1994; Hey and Orme,
1994 ), we also included two check questions to test the
consistency of subjects’ choices. After each subject com-
pleted the ambiguity questions, we estimated his match-
ing probability, q . We then generated two check questions
by changing the known probability of winning for Box K to
q + 10% in the ﬁrst question and q − 10% in the second. Box
U remained unchanged. A subject’s response is deemed in-
consistent if he preferred the ambiguous Box U in the ﬁrst
check question or the unambiguous Box K in the second
check question. Online Appendix A details the elicitation
procedure including the consistency checks. 
3. Data and variables 
Our survey module to measure ambiguity aversion was
implemented in the RAND American Life Panel. 8 The ALP
consists of several thousand households that regularly an-
swer Internet surveys. Households lacking Internet access
at the recruiting stage were provided with a laptop and
wireless service to limit selection biases. To ensure that
the sample is representative of the US population, we use
survey weights provided by the ALP for all analyses and
summary statistics reported in this paper. Our ambigu-
ity survey was ﬁelded in mid-March 2012, and the sur-
vey was closed in mid-April 2012. In addition to the am-
biguity aversion variables derived from our module, we
use variables derived from other ALP surveys. Many ofstatistically signiﬁcant ( p -value = 0.31). Furthermore, the average match- 
ing probability of the color choice group is not signiﬁcantly different from 
that in the main survey sample. 
8 See Online Appendix B for more information about the ALP. A com- 
parison of the ALP and alternative data sources is available at https: 
//mmicdata.rand.org/alp/index.php?page=comparison . 
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Table 1 
Variables in the American Life Panel survey module. 
Variable name Deﬁnition 
Stock Ownership Indicator that respondent holds equities in his personal portfolio (stocks or stock mutual funds) 
Fraction Allocated to Stocks Equity holdings as a % of ﬁnancial assets (checking, saving, money market, bonds, CDs, mutual 
funds, and stocks) 
Foreign Stock Ownership Indicator that respondent holds foreign stocks in his personal portfolio 
Own-Company Stock Ownership Indicator that respondent holds his employer’s stocks in his personal portfolio 
Individual Stock Ownership Indicator that respondent holds individual stocks in his personal portfolio 
Fraction of Equity Allocated to Individual Stocks Individual stock holdings as a % of assets invested in stocks 
Stock Sales during Crisis Indicator if respondent actively sold stocks during ﬁnancial crisis 
Age Age in years 
Male Indicator for male 
White Indicator if respondent considers himself primarily White 
Hispanic Indicator if respondent considers himself primarily Hispanic 
Married Indicator if respondent is married or has a partner 
Number of Children Number of living children 
Health Self-reported health status ranging from 0 (“Poor”) to 4 (“Excellent”) 
LT High School Indicator if respondent had less than a high school degree 
High School Graduate Indicator if respondent completed high school but not college 
College+ Indicator if respondent completed college 
Employed Indicator if respondent is employed 
Family Income Total income for all household members older than 15, including from jobs, business, farm, rental, 
pension beneﬁts, dividends, interest, social security, and other income 
Wealth The sum of net ﬁnancial wealth, net housing assets, and imputed social security wealth using 
respondent self-reported claim ages, actual or estimated monthly beneﬁts, and cohort life tables 
Deﬁned Contribution Indicator if respondent has a deﬁned contribution pension plan 
Deﬁned Beneﬁt Indicator if respondent has a deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan 
Financial Literacy Number of ﬁnancial literacy questions answered correctly (out of 3 total; see Online Appendix C) 
Trust Ranges from 0 to 5; 0 corresponds to "most people can be trusted" and 5 corresponds to "you 
can’t be too careful" 
Risk Aversion Estimated coeﬃcient of risk aversion based on lottery questions, > 0 if risk averse, = 0 if risk 
neutral, < 0 if risk seeking 
Question Order Indicator if subject answered the risk aversion question before the ambiguity questions (the 
question order was randomized) these are taken from the core ALP modules administered to 
respondents when they enter the ALP or shortly thereafter. 
Furthermore, we use several variables from modules devel- 
oped by other researchers that were ﬁelded between 2008 
and 2014. No speciﬁc subset of respondents is excluded in 
any of these modules and, after a certain period of time, 
the survey was closed. Table 1 deﬁnes all our variables, 
and Table 2 provides summary statistics. The last column 
of Table 2 indicates the number of valid responses for each 
variable. 
The ﬁrst seven rows of Table 2 summarize our key de- 
pendent variables. These ﬁnancial variables were measured 
in different ALP survey modules, many of which included 
only a subset of the ALP participants. The sample sizes of 
the dependent variables differ depending on the number of 
people surveyed in the speciﬁc modules. We ﬁnd no sig- 
niﬁcant correlations between ambiguity aversion and in- 
clusion in these modules, suggesting that sample selection 
bias is unlikely. 
Stock Ownership is an indicator variable equal to one 
if the respondent holds stocks (either individual stocks or 
equity mutual funds) in his personal portfolio. The equity 
participation rate in our sample is 23%. 9 The second row 9 Our sample has a lower equity participation rate than that reported in 
some other studies because we exclude equity ownership in 401(k) plans. 
Such equity holdings might not reﬂect active choices by the respondent, 
as a result of the US Department of Labor’s introduction of target date 
funds (TDFs) as an investment default. This permits employees to hold shows that the unconditional average fraction of ﬁnancial 
assets allocated to stocks is 12%. Conditional on stock mar- 
ket participation, the average fraction is 51%. For the sub- 
sequent dependent variables, the sample sizes are lower 
because our survey module did not overlap perfectly with 
respondents to other modules. Foreign Stock Ownership is 
an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent owns 
foreign stocks or equity mutual funds. Thirteen percent of 
the sample own foreign stocks. Own-Company Stock Own- 
ership is an indicator variable equal to one if the respon- 
dent owns shares in his current or previous employer (out- 
side of his retirement account). Five percent of the sample 
has own-company stock. For own-company stock, we re- 
strict the sample to employed respondents. Individual Stock 
Ownership is an indicator variable equal to one if the re- 
spondent owns individual shares (excluding own-company 
stock). Seventeen percent of the sample owns individual 
shares. Conditional on nonzero equity ownership, the av- 
erage fraction allocated to individual stocks is 42%. For a 
subsample of the individual stock owners, we can observe 
the number of individual shares that they own. Consis- 
tent with other studies of household portfolios, we ﬁnd 
that, conditional on owning individual stocks, the median 
number of individual companies held is two, which sug- 
gests that individual stock ownership is a reasonable proxy equities by default, instead of active choice. For more on TDFs and 401(k) 
plan investment options, see Mitchell and Utkus (2012) . 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics for outcome and control variables. 
This table reports summary statistics for the variables used in our study. Variable deﬁnitions appear in Table 1 . The summary statistics 
for Fraction Allocated to Stocks are shown for all respondents and for the subsample of respondents with a nonzero allocation to equity. 
From the original sample of 3,258 American Life Panel (ALP) respondents, we omit 188 people who spent less than two minutes on the 
ambiguity questions, resulting in a sample size of 3,070 subjects. For several variables in this table, there are missing observations. The 
last column shows the number of non-missing observations for each variable ( N ). All results use ALP survey weights. 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Median Maximum N 
Stock Ownership (%) 0.23 0.42 0 0 1 3,025 
Fraction Allocated to Stocks (%) 0.12 0.27 0 0 1 3,025 
Foreign Stock Ownership (%) 0.13 0.34 0 0 1 799 
Own-Company Stock Ownership (%) 0.05 0.22 0 0 1 670 
Individual Stock Ownership (%) 0.17 0.38 0 0 1 2,757 
Fraction Allocated to Individual Stocks Conditional (%) 0.42 0.44 0 0.24 1 321 
Stock Sales during the Financial Crisis (%) 0.07 0.25 0 0 1 528 
Age 46.38 15.20 18 48 70 3,070 
Male (%) 0.48 0.50 0 0 1 3,070 
White (%) 0.81 0.39 0 1 1 3,066 
Hispanic (%) 0.18 0.38 0 0 1 3,069 
Married (%) 0.64 0.48 0 1 1 2,695 
Number of Children 1.67 1.62 0 2 13 3,024 
Health 2.48 0.93 0 3 4 2,969 
LT High School (%) 0.10 0.29 0 0 1 3,069 
High School (%) 0.34 0.47 0 0 1 3,069 
College+ (%) 0.56 0.50 0 1 1 3,069 
Employed (%) 0.49 0.50 0 0 1 3,068 
Family Income ($) 69,295 69,774 2,500 55,0 0 0 40 0,0 0 0 3,061 
Wealth ($) 317,076 584,485 −88,743 112,928 4,188,110 2,969 
Deﬁned Contribution 0.47 0.50 0 0 1 2,991 
Deﬁned Beneﬁt 0.10 0.31 0 0 1 2,991 
Financial Literacy 2.18 0.93 0 2 3 3,070 
Trust 3.20 1.41 0 3 5 3,035 
Risk Aversion 0.34 0.45 −0.50 0.41 0.98 3,036 
Question Order 0.50 0.50 0 1 1 3,070 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 for under-diversiﬁcation. The variable Stock Sales during the
Financial Crisis is derived from a survey ﬁelded in May
2009, and it is equal to one if the respondent actively sold
stocks during the ﬁnancial crisis, conditional on owning
stocks before the crisis. 10 
In all empirical tests, we control for demographic and
economic characteristics: age, gender, race, ethnicity, mar-
ital status, number of children, self-reported health status,
education, employment status, family income and wealth,
and retirement plan type. Controlling for these variables
partials out the potential confounding effects that they
could have on household portfolio choice, thus providing
cleaner estimates of the effect of ambiguity aversion. 
Our ALP survey module included additional questions
to measure trust, ﬁnancial literacy, and risk aversion. (On-
line Appendix B provides the exact wording of these ques-
tions and additional details.) We include these variables to
avoid omitted variable biases, as these could affect portfo-
lio choice and could measure something conceptually sim-
ilar to ambiguity aversion. For example, ambiguity aver-
sion could be inﬂuenced by trust (i.e., people who distrust
others could assume that ambiguous events are system-10 Although the crisis module was completed nearly three years prior 
to our module, it is unlikely that investment choices made during the 
ﬁnancial crisis would signiﬁcantly affect respondents’ ambiguity aversion 
preferences elicited in the urn domain three years later. As such, we do 
not believe reverse causality is a concern. atically biased against them). For this reason, we follow
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) by adding the trust
question from the World Values Survey. 11 
We also control for ﬁnancial literacy, as prior studies
show it has a strong relation with ﬁnancial decisions (e.g.,
Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014; van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie,
2011 ). To ensure that ambiguity aversion is not simply
a proxy for low ﬁnancial literacy, our survey module in-
cluded three questions akin to those devised by Lusardi
and Mitchell (2007) for the Health and Retirement Study.
Our index of ﬁnancial literacy is the number of correct re-
sponses to these questions. Table 2 shows that, on average,
respondents answer slightly more than two of the ques-
tions correctly. 
Our methodology is designed to elicit ambiguity aver-
sion in a manner unaffected by risk aversion. Nevertheless,
we control for risk aversion for two reasons. First, we seek
to ensure that our ambiguity aversion variable captures a
distinct component of preferences, separate from risk aver-
sion. Second, ambiguity aversion and risk aversion could
be correlated, in which case ambiguity attitudes could pro-
vide little incremental information about preferences. To11 Although our question is the same as theirs, the ALP uses a different 
response scale. The ALP asks subjects to select a response along a six- 
point Likert scale, with zero indicating strong agreement with the state- 
ment that others can be trusted and ﬁve indicating strong disagreement. 
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) use a binary variable indicating ei- 
ther agreement or disagreement. 
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Fig. 2. Choosing between two boxes with purple and orange balls, one having a sure (100%) chance of winning and the other having a risky but well- 
deﬁned probability distribution of outcomes. This ﬁgure shows a screen shot from our American Life Panel module in the probability risk sequence. If the 
respondent chooses Box A, he wins with certainty; if he chooses Box B, winning is random. If he selects “Box A,” the respondent gets a new question with 
a higher probability of winning in Box B (more purple balls). If he selects “Box B,” the next question has a lower winning probability in Box B. If he selects 
“Indifferent,” the question sequence is complete. 
12 Butler, Guiso, and Jappelli (2014) elicit ambiguity aversion in a survey 
of Italian retail bank investors. They seek to link decision-making styles 
to ambiguity and risk attitudes, in contrast with our goals in the present 
paper. measure risk aversion, we modify the Tanaka, Camerer, and 
Nguyen (2010) method. Furthermore, we include ﬁnancial 
wealth as a control variable, which is the strongest pre- 
dictor of risk aversion in household data ( Calvet and So- 
dini, 2014 ). As shown in Fig. 2 , we ask the respondent to 
choose between a certain outcome and a risky outcome. 
Based on the response, the survey generates a new binary 
choice similar to the method for eliciting ambiguity aver- 
sion described previously. Table 2 shows that the average 
respondent is risk-averse, but there is substantial variation 
and some people are risk seeking. The order of the risk and 
ambiguity elicitation questions was randomized in the sur- 
vey. In the regressions, we include a dummy for the ques- 
tion order as a control. 
Table 3 summarizes ambiguity aversion in the ALP 
sample. Panel A shows that 52% of the respondents 
are ambiguity-averse, 10% are ambiguity-neutral, and 38% 
are ambiguity-seeking. These results are roughly consis- tent with the ﬁndings from a targeted survey of Italian 
households by Butler, Guiso, and Jappelli (2014) . 12 They 
are also within the range of results from a large number 
of studies summarized by Oechssler and Roomets (2014) 
and Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2015) . Panel B sum- 
marizes the key ambiguity aversion measure: on aver- 
age, respondents are ambiguity-averse, but strong hetero- 
geneity also exists in ambiguity preferences. This ﬁnding 
is of importance for the ﬁnance literature, as Bossaerts, 
Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, and Zame (2010) show that het- 
erogeneity in investors’ ambiguity aversion results in equi- 
librium asset prices that cannot be replicated by a stan- 
dard representative agent model with one representative 
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Table 3 
Ambiguity aversion in the US population. 
This table shows ambiguity aversion in the US population measured using our American Life Panel (ALP) sur- 
vey module. Panel A shows the proportion of respondents who are ambiguity-averse, ambiguity-seeking, or 
ambiguity-neutral, as revealed by their ﬁrst-round choice between Box K and Box U (see text and Fig. 1 ). Panel 
B summarizes the Ambiguity Aversion measure. We deﬁne Ambiguity Aversion = 50% − q where q denotes the 
matching probability for Box U in Fig. 1 (with two ball colors, in unknown proportions). Panel C summarizes 
the percentage of respondents who gave inconsistent answers to the two check questions. Panel D shows the 
pairwise correlations between ambiguity aversion and variables measuring education, ﬁnancial literacy, self- 
assessed stock market knowledge, and making errors on the check questions. The sample size is N = 3,040. Of 
the initial 3,258 respondents in our ALP survey, 188 were eliminated because they took less than two min- 
utes to answer the survey questions. Of the remaining 3,070 respondents, 30 did not complete the ambiguity 
questions. ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Proportion of respondents ambiguity-averse, -neutral, and -seeking 
Measure % 
Ambiguity-averse 0.52 
Ambiguity-neutral 0.10 
Ambiguity-seeking 0.38 
Panel B: Summary statistics ambiguity aversion measure 
Measure Mean Standard deviation Minimum Median Maximum 
Ambiguity Aversion 0.018 0.213 −0.440 0.030 0.470 
Panel C: Check question responses 
Question Not inconsistent Inconsistent 
Check question 1 69.6% 30.4% 
Check question 2 86.0% 14.0% 
Panel D: Bivariate correlations with ambiguity aversion measure 
Educational Level Correlation 
High School Graduate −0.05 ∗∗∗
College+ 0.07 ∗∗∗
Financial Literacy 0.04 ∗∗
Self- Assessed Stock Market Knowledge 0.03 
Errors on Check −0.16 ∗∗∗
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ambiguity-averse agent (we explore the asset pricing im-
plications of our estimates in Section 8 and Online Ap-
pendix D). 13 Panel C shows the results for the two check
questions. The percentage of respondents giving inconsis-
tent answers is 30.4 for the ﬁrst question and 14.0 for the
second. These rates are similar to those found in laboratory
studies of preferences (e.g., Harless and Camerer, 1994 ).
In all subsequent regressions, we include a dummy vari-
able for whether the respondent made errors on the check
questions as a control. 
In an additional analysis of the demographics of ambi-
guity aversion not detailed here (but shown in Table C1
of Online Appendix C), we regress the ambiguity aversion
measure on the control variables. Naturally, these regres-
sions do not imply causality. Instead, regression is a con-
venient tool to summarize the correlation structure of the
data. We ﬁnd that standard economic and demographic
characteristics explain little of the variation in ambiguity
aversion and, thus, the effect of ambiguity aversion on eco-
nomic decisions is not subsumed by commonly used con-
trol variables. 
Panel D of Table 3 shows the pairwise correlations be-
tween ambiguity aversion and education, ﬁnancial literacy,13 The heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion is equally strong (compara- 
ble to full sample results in Table 3 ) among subgroups that matter most 
for ﬁnancial markets, namely, stockholders and wealthy individuals. 
 
 
 
 self-assessed stock market knowledge, and errors on the
check questions. Although this is not the main focus of
our paper, we include these tests to explore the under-
lying nature of our measure of ambiguity aversion. Some
authors argue that ambiguity aversion is primarily a mis-
take, caused by poor reasoning about probabilities (e.g., Al-
Najjar and Weinstein, 2009 ; Halevy, 2007 ). Others contend
that ambiguity aversion is a preference and not a mistake
(e.g., see the extensive review in Machina and Siniscalchi,
2014 and evidence in Abdellaoui, Klibanoff, and Placido,
2015 ). Although the magnitudes of the correlations are not
large, Panel D of Table 3 shows that ambiguity aversion
is positively correlated with college education and nega-
tively correlated with errors on the check questions. This
is consistent with other population studies such as Butler,
Guiso, and Jappelli (2014) and Chew, Ratchford, and Sagi
(2013) . Moreover, the correlations are directionally incon-
sistent with the mistake view and thus provide indirect
support for the preference view. 
4. Ambiguity aversion: participation and the fraction of 
ﬁnancial assets allocated to equities 
This section tests the relation between ambiguity aver-
sion and household ﬁnancial behavior, in particular stock
market participation and the fraction of ﬁnancial as-
sets allocated to stocks. All models reported in this
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Table 4 
Ambiguity aversion and stock market participation. 
This table shows results of probit regressions in which the dependent 
variable equals one if the respondent participates in the stock market. 
In Column 1, the key independent variable is the Ambiguity Aversion 
measure. In Column 2, the key independent variable is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the respondent is ambiguity-averse. In Column 
3, the key independent variable is the rank transformation of Ambigu- 
ity Aversion . All models include a constant term and controls for age, 
age-squared divided by a thousand, male, white, Hispanic, married, (ln) 
number of children (plus one), health, education, employment status, 
(ln) family income, wealth divided by a hundred thousand, participa- 
tion in deﬁned contribution or deﬁned beneﬁt plans, ﬁnancial literacy, 
trust, risk aversion, question order, check question score, and missing 
data dummies. The sample size is N = 2,943. Of the initial 3,258 re- 
spondents in our American Life Panel survey, 188 were eliminated be- 
cause they took less than two minutes to answer the survey questions, 
another 30 subjects did not complete the ambiguity questions, and 97 
had missing socio-demographic information. All nonbinary variables are 
standardized. The table reports marginal effects. Standard errors are 
clustered by household and appear in brackets. ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote sig- 
niﬁcance signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Ambiguity Aversion −0 .020 ∗∗
[0 .01] 
Ambiguity Aversion Dummy −0 .039 ∗∗
[0 .02] 
Ambiguity Aversion Rank −0 .021 ∗∗
[0 .01] 
Age −0 .029 −0 .022 −0 .027 
[0 .07] [0 .07] [0 .07] 
Age 2 0 .042 0 .036 0 .040 
[0 .07] [0 .07] [0 .07] 
Male 0 .005 0 .006 0 .006 
[0 .02] [0 .02] [0 .02] 
White 0 .045 ∗ 0 .047 ∗ 0 .045 ∗
[0 .02] [0 .02] [0 .02] 
Hispanic −0 .092 ∗∗∗ −0 .092 ∗∗∗ −0 .092 ∗∗∗
[0 .03] [0 .03] [0 .03] 
Married 0 .051 ∗∗ 0 .052 ∗∗ 0 .051 ∗∗
[0 .02] [0 .02] [0 .02] 
Number of Children −0 .024 ∗∗ −0 .024 ∗∗ −0 .023 ∗∗
[0 .01] [0 .01] [0 .01] 
Health 0 .024 ∗∗ 0 .025 ∗∗ 0 .025 ∗∗
[0 .01] [0 .01] [0 .01] 
High School −0 .020 −0 .021 −0 .020 
[0 .06] [0 .06] [0 .06] 
College+ 0 .036 0 .034 0 .036 
[0 .06] [0 .06] [0 .06] 
Employed 0 .005 0 .005 0 .005 
[0 .02] [0 .02] [0 .02] 
Family Income 0 .053 ∗∗∗ 0 .052 ∗∗∗ 0 .053 ∗∗∗
[0 .02] [0 .02] [0 .02] 
Wealth 0 .050 ∗∗∗ 0 .050 ∗∗∗ 0 .050 ∗∗∗
[0 .01] [0 .01] [0 .01] 
Deﬁned Contribution 0 .056 ∗∗ 0 .055 ∗∗ 0 .055 ∗∗
[0 .02] [0 .02] [0 .02] 
Deﬁned Beneﬁt −0 .054 ∗∗ −0 .052 ∗∗ −0 .053 ∗∗
[0 .02] [0 .02] [0 .02] 
Financial Literacy 0 .068 ∗∗∗ 0 .068 ∗∗∗ 0 .068 ∗∗∗
[0 .01] [0 .01] [0 .01] section include controls for age, age-squared, gender, 
white, Hispanic, married, (ln) number of children (plus 
one), self-reported health status, education, employment 
status, (ln) family income, wealth, deﬁned contribution 
plan and deﬁned beneﬁt plan participation dummies, ﬁ- 
nancial literacy, trust, risk aversion, question order, errors 
on the check questions, missing data dummies, and a con- 
stant term. 14 For all models, we report robust standard er- 
rors clustered at the household level. 15 
4.1. Ambiguity aversion and stock market participation 
Table 4 shows the results of probit models that test 
the relation between ambiguity aversion and stock mar- 
ket participation. The table reports marginal effects, 
not coeﬃcients. The dependent variable is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the respondent owns individual 
stocks or equity mutual funds and zero otherwise. In 
Column 1, the independent variable is Ambiguity Aversion 
( = 50% − q ), where q is the matching probability. For ease 
of interpretation this variable is standardized. In Column 
2, the ambiguity aversion variable is Ambiguity Aversion 
Dummy , which is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
respondent’s choice indicates ambiguity aversion in the 
ﬁrst round of the question. In Column 3, the independent 
variable is Ambiguity Aversion Rank , which is simply a rank 
transformation of the main Ambiguity Aversion variable 
(zero indicating the lowest level of ambiguity aversion and 
one the highest). We include this variable to show that the 
signiﬁcance of our main ambiguity aversion variable is not 
driven by outliers. The results are similar for all three vari- 
ables. Accordingly, in subsequent tables we focus primarily 
on the results for Ambiguity Aversion . In robustness tests, 
we also estimate models using a measure of ambiguity 
aversion in which all ambiguity-seeking individuals are 
recoded as ambiguity-neutral. Results are robust to this 
change. 
Consistent with the predictions of theory, a signiﬁcant 
negative relation exists between ambiguity aversion and 
stock market participation. Further, the economic magni- 
tude is large. The coeﬃcient in Column 1 of Panel A im- 
plies that a one standard deviation increase in ambiguity 
aversion is associated with a 2.0 percentage point decrease 
in the probability of participating in the stock market (8.7% 
relative to the baseline rate of 23 percentage points). To 
put this in perspective, the implied economic magnitude 
of a one standard deviation change in ambiguity aversion 
is equivalent to a change in wealth of 0.41 standard devia- 
tions ($238,0 0 0). 
Some authors argue that modest participation costs can 
account for a sizable fraction of nonparticipation ( Haliassos 
and Bertaut, 1995; Gomes and Michaelides, 2005 ; 14 Results are robust to alternative deﬁnitions of wealth and functional 
forms for wealth and also to excluding observations with missing data 
(instead of including these observations with missing data dummy vari- 
ables). In the interest of brevity, we do not report the coeﬃcients for the 
missing data dummies (available on request). 
15 The sample of 2,943 individuals includes respondents from 2,683 
unique households, as in some cases we elicit ambiguity attitudes from 
multiple members of the same household. The results are similar if we 
include only one observation per household. 
Trust −0 .004 −0 .004 −0 .004 
[0 .01] [0 .01] [0 .01] 
Risk Aversion 0 .019 ∗∗ 0 .019 ∗∗ 0 .019 ∗∗
[0 .01] [0 .01] [0 .01] 
Question Order 0 .028 0 .029 ∗ 0 .030 ∗
[0 .02] [0 .02] [0 .02] 
Errors on Check −0 .029 −0 .032 ∗ −0 .031 
[0 .02] [0 .02] [0 .02] 
Controls and constant Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,943 2,943 2,943 
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Table 5 
Ambiguity aversion and portfolio choice: check questions and ﬁnancial assets. 
This table shows results of probit regressions in which the dependent variable 
equals one if the respondent participates in the stock market. The main indepen- 
dent variable of interest in Panels A, B, and C are Ambiguity Aversion, Ambiguity 
Aversion Dummy , and Ambiguity Aversion Rank , respectively. Columns 2 and 4 ex- 
clude respondents whose answers to the check question were inconsistent with 
their earlier choices. Columns 3 and 4 exclude respondents who report ﬁnancial 
assets of less than $500. All models include a constant term and controls for age, 
age-squared, male, white, Hispanic, married, (ln) number of children (plus one), 
health, education, employment status, (ln) family income, wealth, participation in 
deﬁned contribution or deﬁned beneﬁt plans, ﬁnancial literacy, trust, risk aversion, 
question order, a check question score equal to one if the subject got either of the 
check questions wrong (that is, they chose Box U in the ﬁrst check question or 
Box K in the second check question), and missing data dummies. The independent 
variable in Panels A and C is standardized to facilitate interpretation. The table re- 
ports marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered by household and appear in 
brackets. ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote signiﬁcance signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively. 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Results for Ambiguity Aversion 
Ambiguity Aversion −0.020 ∗∗ −0.025 ∗ −0.037 ∗∗ −0.047 ∗∗
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] 
Consistent responses only No Yes No Yes 
Financial assets ≥$500 No No Yes Yes 
Controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,943 1,746 1,881 1,199 
Panel B: Results for Ambiguity Aversion Dummy 
Ambiguity Aversion Dummy −0.039 ∗∗ −0.031 −0.072 ∗∗∗ −0.058 ∗
[0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] 
Consistent responses only No Yes No Yes 
Financial assets ≥$500 No No Yes Yes 
Controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,943 1,746 1,881 1,199 
Panel C: Results for Ambiguity Aversion Rank 
Ambiguity Aversion Rank −0.021 ∗∗ −0.023 ∗ −0.039 ∗∗∗ −0.043 ∗∗
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] 
Consistent responses only No Yes No Yes 
Financial assets ≥$500 No No Yes Yes 
Controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,943 1,746 1,881 1,199 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002 ). Such costs cannot, how-
ever, explain nonparticipation among those with
moderate levels of ﬁnancial assets ( Andersen and Nielsen,
2011; Campbell, 2006 ). Thus, participation by those with
at least some ﬁnancial assets is of particular interest. We
explore this issue in Column 3 of Table 5 , which displays
results for the subset of respondents having ﬁnancial
assets of at least $500 (as in Heaton and Lucas, 20 0 0 ). For
this restricted sample, both the statistical and economic
signiﬁcance of ambiguity aversion rise. The marginal effect
in Column 3 of Panel A of Table 5 implies a one standard
deviation increase in ambiguity aversion is associated with
a 3.7 percentage point decrease in the probability of par-
ticipating in the stock market (9.9% relative to the baseline
participation rate in this subsample of 37.3 percentage
points). 
Overall, our results conﬁrm the predictions of theory.
Higher ambiguity aversion is associated with lower stock
market participation. Further, the results are stronger for
households with at least moderate levels of ﬁnancial as-
sets, a group whose equity nonparticipation is otherwise
diﬃcult to explain. 4.2. Measurement error in preference elicitation and other 
alternative explanations 
Although we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relation between our
measure of ambiguity aversion and stock market partici-
pation, it is important to establish that our key indepen-
dent variable is, in fact, a valid measure of ambiguity aver-
sion. The reliability of subjects’ responses is one of the
most common concerns that economists have with survey
data. A large literature beginning with Harless and Camerer
(1994) and Hey and Orme (1994) shows that subjects of-
ten provide inconsistent responses to nontrivial questions
about preferences. To empirically address this issue, our
module includes the two check questions described above,
which test the consistency of respondents’ choices. The es-
timated ambiguity aversion of the respondents whose an-
swers are inconsistent could contain greater measurement
error. 
For this reason, Columns 2 and 4 of Table 5 exclude re-
spondents who gave inconsistent answers to either check
question. Among this subsample, ambiguity aversion is
signiﬁcantly higher. Respondents who did not make errors
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Table 6 
Ambiguity aversion and the fraction of ﬁnancial assets 
allocated to stocks. 
This table shows results for Tobit regressions where 
the dependent variable refers to the fraction of ﬁnan- 
cial assets allocated to equities. Column 2 excludes re- 
spondents who do not participate in the stock mar- 
ket. All models include a constant term and controls 
for age, age-squared, male, white, Hispanic, married, 
(ln) number of children (plus one), health, education, 
employment status, (ln) family income, wealth, par- 
ticipation in deﬁned contribution or deﬁned bene- 
ﬁt plans, ﬁnancial literacy, trust, risk aversion, ques- 
tion order, check question score, and missing data 
dummies. The independent variables are standardized 
to facilitate interpretation. Standard errors are clus- 
tered by household and appear in brackets. ∗ , ∗∗ , and 
∗∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Model (1) (2) 
Ambiguity Aversion −0.079 ∗∗ −0.040 ∗
[0.03] [0.02] 
Equity ownership > 0 only No Yes 
Controls and constant Yes Yes 
N 2,943 731 
17 Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) also ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant relation 
between risk aversion and portfolio holdings. 
18 Puri and Robinson (2007) measure optimism based on peoples’ mis- 
calibration of their life expectancies and argue that optimism signiﬁcantly on the check questions have measured ambiguity aver- 
sion that is 2.9 percentage points higher than the respon- 
dents who did make errors. Consistent with attenuation 
bias from measurement error, the ambiguity aversion vari- 
able is not signiﬁcantly different from zero for those re- 
spondents who made errors on the check questions. The 
implied economic magnitude of the effect of ambiguity 
aversion on portfolio choice is also considerably larger in 
the subsample without errors on the check questions in 
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 5 , consistent with less atten- 
uation bias. For instance, in Column 2 of Panel A, the 
estimated marginal effect is 25% larger than the corre- 
sponding marginal effect in Column 1 for the full sample. 
Finding stronger results for this subsample, in which our 
measure of ambiguity aversion is more reliable, suggests 
two things. First, it supports our interpretation of the main 
results, while it is inconsistent with alternative explana- 
tions based on misunderstandings of the elicitation ques- 
tions or measurement error. Second, our baseline estimates 
potentially understate the true economic magnitude of the 
relation between ambiguity aversion and household port- 
folio choice. 
Another concern is that low education or cognitive skill 
could drive both ambiguity aversion and nonparticipation. 
In fact, ambiguity aversion is higher among the college- 
educated, a ﬁnding that is directionally inconsistent with 
this alternative explanation. 16 Part of our sample also an- 
swered a module measuring cognitive ability. In robustness 
tests, we ﬁnd that including an index of cognitive ability 
does not alter the ambiguity aversion results. Further, the 
correlation between cognitive ability and ambiguity aver- 
sion is not signiﬁcant. 
Similarly, ﬁnancial illiteracy could drive both nonpar- 
ticipation and ambiguity aversion. Ex ante this seems un- 
likely, as ﬁnancial literacy explains little of the variation 
in ambiguity aversion (see Online Appendix C, Table C-1). 
But to guard against this possibility, we also control for ﬁ- 
nancial literacy. The results show that ﬁnancial literacy has 
a highly signiﬁcant positive association with stock mar- 
ket participation, consistent with van Rooij, Lusardi, and 
Alessie (2011) . Controlling for ﬁnancial literacy, however, 
does not diminish the negative relation between ambigu- 
ity aversion and stock market participation. 
Another concern is that ambiguity aversion could be 
correlated with risk aversion, in which case our ambi- 
guity aversion variables could capture little incremental 
information. Although our elicitation method is designed 
to measure ambiguity aversion independent of any effect 
from risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and risk aversion 
could still be correlated, for instance, if individuals who 
are highly risk averse also have very strong preferences for 
risk over ambiguity. To control for this possibility, all spec- 
iﬁcations include our elicited measure of risk aversion. In 
the full sample, risk aversion is signiﬁcant at the 5% level 
and positively related to equity market participation, but 
this effect dissipates in the subset of subjects having at 
least $500 in ﬁnancial assets. We ﬁnd this odd relation is 16 This is detailed in Online Appendix, Table C-1. The positive relation 
between ambiguity aversion and education is consistent with prior popu- 
lation studies, such as Butler, Guiso, and Jappelli (2014) . driven entirely by a small subset of respondents who re- 
port extreme risk seeking in their responses. If we elimi- 
nate these risk-seeking respondents from the analysis, the 
relation between risk aversion and participation is insignif- 
icantly negative. 17 Also, our results for foreign and own- 
company stock ownership, discussed in Section 5 , are di- 
rectionally inconsistent with the possibility that our am- 
biguity aversion variable inadvertently measures risk aver- 
sion. 
All speciﬁcations also include a control variable for trust 
in other people, following Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 
(2008) . 18 Trust is important, as the ambiguity aversion 
variable could conceivably measure subjects’ distrust of the 
experiment; that is, subjects could believe that ambigu- 
ous situations are systematically biased against them. In 
our sample, the relation between trust and participation is 
directionally consistent with Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 
(2008) . More important, the results for ambiguity aversion 
are robust to controlling for trust. 
4.3. Ambiguity aversion and the fraction of ﬁnancial assets 
allocated to stocks 
Table 6 reports results from Tobit regressions that test 
the relation between ambiguity aversion and the fraction 
of ﬁnancial assets allocated to stocks. Column 1 presents affects household portfolio choice. We do not have all of the information 
they use to calculate optimism, but for some of our respondents we ob- 
serve whether they overestimate their probability of living past age 75. 
Our results do not change when adding this variable as a control (results 
are available upon request). 
S.G. Dimmock et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 119 (2016) 559–577 571 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 results using the full sample, and Column 2 presents re-
sults for the subsample of respondents with nonzero stock
ownership. 
As predicted by theory (e.g., Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang,
2007; Peijnenburg, 2014 ), all columns show a negative re-
lation between ambiguity aversion and the fraction of ﬁ-
nancial assets allocated to equity. This relation holds for
the full sample, as well as for the portfolio allocations of
stockholders. In Column 2, for an individual with nonzero
ownership, the implied decrease in portfolio allocation to
equity from a one standard deviation increase in ambiguity
aversion is 4.0 percentage points (7.8% relative to the con-
ditional average allocation of 51.4 percentage points). Over-
all, the results show a strong negative relation between
ambiguity aversion and portfolio allocations to equity. 
5. Ambiguity aversion, home-bias, and own-company 
stock ownership 
Section 4 focused on investments in stocks as a broad
asset category. In this section, we turn to the relation be-
tween ambiguity aversion and ownership of two speciﬁc
categories of stocks: foreign and own-company stocks. For
an ambiguity-averse investor, the attractiveness of a par-
ticular category of stock is partially determined by the in-
vestor’s familiarity with that category. French and Poterba
(1991 , p. 225) suggest that the unfamiliarity of foreign
stocks could explain the home-bias puzzle. Several theo-
retical papers formalize this idea, arguing that ambiguity-
averse individuals are particularly reluctant to invest in
foreign stocks, which they perceive as having greater am-
biguity (e.g., Boyle, Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang, 2012; Cao,
Han, Hirshleifer, and Zhang, 2011; Epstein and Miao, 2003;
Uppal and Wang, 2003 ). Following similar logic, theory
suggests that ambiguity aversion can explain the own-
company stock puzzle, as ambiguity-averse individuals pre-
fer to invest in their employer’s stock, which for them has
relatively low ambiguity ( Boyle, Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang,
2012; Boyle, Uppal, and Wang, 2003; Cao, Han, Hirshleifer,
and Zhang, 2011 ). 
Table 7 shows the results of probit models that test
the relation between ambiguity aversion and ownership
of two speciﬁc categories of equity. In Columns 1 and 2,
the dependent variable equals one if the individual holds
foreign stock outside his 401(k) plan. In Columns 3 and
4, the dependent variable equals one if the individual
owns shares of his employer’s stock outside his 401(k)
plan. 19 For the own-company stock ownership regressions,
we limit the sample to individuals employed by someone
other than themselves (i.e., the retired, self-employed, and
unemployed are excluded, as own-company stock owner-
ship is not meaningful for them). In Columns 1 and 3, the
sample includes all individuals for whom we have data.
In Columns 2 and 4, we limit the sample to individuals
with nonzero stock ownership. All speciﬁcations include
the same control variables as in Table 4 , and the reported19 Although the prior literature largely focuses on own-company stock 
in 401(k) plans, we focus on holdings in non-retirement accounts as our 
data do not allow us to distinguish whether ownership within a retire- 
ment plan is voluntary or due to matching. 
 
 
 
 
 standard errors are clustered by household. The data for
both dependent variables come from modules that do not
perfectly overlap with our sample, so this table has fewer
observations. 
Consistent with the predictions of theory, we ﬁnd a sig-
niﬁcant negative relation between ambiguity aversion and
foreign stock ownership, and a signiﬁcant positive rela-
tion between ambiguity aversion and own-company stock
ownership. The marginal effects reported in Column 1,
in which the sample includes both stock market partici-
pants and nonparticipants, imply that a one standard de-
viation increase in ambiguity aversion is associated with a
2.6 percentage point decrease in the probability of own-
ing foreign stocks (19.5% relative to the baseline rate of
13.3 percentage points). The results in Column 2 show
that the negative relation between ambiguity aversion and
foreign stock ownership is not simply a result of the
negative relation between ambiguity aversion and equity
ownership. Even among equity market participants, higher
ambiguity aversion is negatively associated with owner-
ship of foreign stocks. Once again, the implied economic
magnitude is large. A one standard deviation increase in
ambiguity aversion is associated with an 8.0 percentage
point decrease in the probability of foreign stock owner-
ship (29.6% relative to the baseline rate of 27.0 percentage
points). 
Also consistent with the theory’s predictions, we ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant positive relation between ambiguity aversion
and own-company stock ownership. Marginal effects re-
ported in Column 3, where the sample includes both stock
market participants and nonparticipants, imply that a one
standard deviation increase in ambiguity aversion is asso-
ciated with a 1.4 percentage point increase in the proba-
bility of own-company stock ownership (28.0% relative to
the baseline rate of 5.0 percentage points). Although this
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at only the 10% level, the result
is intriguing as it suggests that the ambiguity-averse are
more likely to invest in own-company stock, even relative
to the alternative of nonparticipation in any form of equity.
Furthermore, Column 4 shows that the positive relation
between ambiguity aversion and own-company stock own-
ership is signiﬁcant among the sample of stock market par-
ticipants. Once again, the implied economic magnitude is
large. A one standard deviation increase in ambiguity aver-
sion is associated with an 11.7 percentage point increase in
own-company stock ownership. 
Table 7 additionally presents the ﬁrst direct empirical
evidence that ambiguity aversion is signiﬁcantly related to
both the home-bias and the own-company stock puzzles.
These results are inconsistent with the possibility that our
measure of ambiguity aversion inadvertently captures risk
aversion. Higher risk aversion should increase the proba-
bility of foreign stock ownership because of the diversiﬁca-
tion beneﬁts and decrease the probability of own-company
stock ownership because of portfolio diversiﬁcation and
the background risk associated with investing in one’s em-
ployer. For both foreign and own-company stock, the di-
rectional predictions of ambiguity aversion are exactly the
opposite. More generally, the results in Table 7 pose a chal-
lenge to alternative interpretations of our ambiguity aver-
sion measure. Any alternative interpretation would have to
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Table 7 
Ambiguity aversion: foreign stocks and own-company stock ownership. 
This table shows results for probit regressions in which the dependent variable equals one 
if the respondent holds foreign stock or own-company stock. Columns 1 and 2 show probit 
regression results for foreign stock ownership. Columns 3 and 4 show probit regression re- 
sults for own-company stock ownership. Columns 2 and 4 exclude respondents who do not 
participate in the stock market. Columns 3 and 4 exclude respondents who are not currently 
employed. All models include a constant term and controls for age, age-squared, male, white, 
Hispanic, married, (ln) number of children (plus one), health, education, employment status, 
(ln) family income, wealth, participation in deﬁned contribution or deﬁned beneﬁt plans, ﬁ- 
nancial literacy, trust, risk aversion, question order, check question score, and missing data 
dummies. The independent variables are standardized to facilitate interpretation. The table 
reports marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered by household and appear in brackets. 
∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Foreign stock ownership Own-company stock ownership 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ambiguity Aversion −0 .026 ∗∗ −0 .080 ∗∗ 0 .014 ∗ 0 .117 ∗∗
[0 .01] [0 .03] [0 .01] [0 .05] 
Equity ownership > 0 only No Yes No Yes 
Controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 779 258 664 155 
20 Our ALP survey includes the following question: “How would you rate 
your knowledge about the stock market?” Answers are measured on a 5- 
point scale (very low, low, moderate, high, very high). We use “very low”
as a cutoff because more than 30% of respondents rate their knowledge 
as very low. The results are qualitatively similar if we instead use “low”
as the cutoff. be consistent with both a negative relation between our 
measure and most forms of equity, and a positive relation 
with own-company stock. 
6. Ambiguity aversion and stock market competence: 
participation and under-diversiﬁcation 
The prior section tested the effect of ambiguity aver- 
sion on investment decisions for unfamiliar assets (for- 
eign stocks) and familiar assets (own-company stock). In 
this section, we further test how the effect of ambigu- 
ity aversion differs across investors, depending on the in- 
vestors’ familiarity (or competence) with the overall stock 
market. 
6.1. Ambiguity aversion, stock market competence, and stock 
market participation 
Our tests are motivated by the competence hypothe- 
sis of Heath and Tversky (1991) , that most people are 
ambiguity-averse toward decisions in areas that are un- 
familiar or purely chance-based ambiguity (such as an 
Ellsberg urn), but that ambiguity aversion is reduced for 
decisions in areas for which the individual sees himself 
as knowledgeable or competent. Hence, individuals with 
high stock market competence would display less ambi- 
guity aversion toward ﬁnancial decisions, compared with 
Ellsberg urns (a low competence task). Conversely, indi- 
viduals with low stock market competence would display 
similar ambiguity aversion toward ﬁnancial decisions and 
Ellsberg urns, as they do not feel competent in either 
setting. This implies that the relation between ambigu- 
ity aversion (based on Ellsberg urns) and portfolio choice 
should be stronger for those with relatively low stock mar- 
ket competence. 
In this subsection, we use two direct measures of low 
stock market competence. First, we identify respondents whose self-assessed ﬁnancial knowledge is very low. 20 Sec- 
ond, we identify respondents who made errors on the ﬁ- 
nancial literacy questions. We then separately estimate the 
effect of ambiguity aversion within two subgroups: those 
with high competence and those with low competence. 
We acknowledge the possibility that these measures of 
stock market competence could be endogenous. For exam- 
ple, individuals who own stocks can learn from their expe- 
rience, creating a reverse causality problem. Alternatively, 
both stock ownership and stock market competence could 
be determined by some other factor (for a lucid discussion 
of potential endogeneity problems in studies of ﬁnancial 
literacy, see van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie, 2011 ). The po- 
tential endogeneity problems, however, primarily affect the 
interpretation of the coeﬃcients for the stock market com- 
petence variables, not the interaction of stock market com- 
petence with ambiguity aversion. 
In Table 8 we test how ambiguity aversion and stock 
market competence interact to affect stock market partic- 
ipation. For ease of comparison, Column 1 repeats the re- 
sults from Table 4 , which shows the relation between am- 
biguity aversion and stock market participation controlling 
for the level of stock market competence (proxied by the 
number of correct responses on the ﬁnancial literacy ques- 
tions). In contrast, Columns 2 and 3 also allow stock mar- 
ket competence to affect the sensitivity of the relation be- 
tween ambiguity aversion and stock market participation. 
In these columns we estimate the effect of ambiguity aver- 
sion separately for the low and high self-assessed stock 
market knowledge (or ﬁnancial literacy) groups. In these 
speciﬁcations, we also replace the ﬁnancial literacy control 
variable with the variable used to divide the sample (i.e., 
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Table 8 
Ambiguity aversion and stock market competence. 
This table shows results for probit regressions in which the dependent variable is equals one if the re- 
spondent participates in the stock market. Column 1 includes no interaction term between stock market 
competence and Ambiguity Aversion ( AA ). Column 2 includes interaction terms between the level of self- 
assessed stock market knowledge and Ambiguity Aversion, and Column (3) includes interaction terms be- 
tween the level of ﬁnancial literacy and Ambiguity Aversion . Respondents have low literacy if their answer 
to one or more of the three ﬁnancial literacy questions is wrong. Respondents have low knowledge if they 
answer “very low” to the question: “How would you rate your knowledge about the stock market?” All 
models include a constant term and controls for age, age-squared, male, white, Hispanic, married, (ln) 
number of children (plus one), health, education, employment status, (ln) family income, wealth, partic- 
ipation in deﬁned contribution or deﬁned beneﬁt retirement plans, ﬁnancial literacy, trust, risk aversion, 
question order, check question score, and missing data dummies. The independent variables are standard- 
ized to facilitate interpretation. The table reports marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered by house- 
hold and appear in brackets. ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
No interaction Self-assessed knowledge Financial literacy 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Ambiguity Aversion −0 .020 ∗∗
[0 .01] 
AA : low stock market competence −0 .046 ∗∗∗ −0 .033 ∗∗
[0 .02] [0 .01] 
AA : high stock market competence −0 .012 −0 .009 
[0 .01] [0 .01] 
Stock market competence 0 .068 ∗∗∗ 0 .185 ∗∗∗ 0 .124 ∗∗∗
[0 .01] [0 .02] [0 .02] 
Controls and constant Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,943 2,943 2,943 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 We have fewer observations for the Tobit models as we do not ob- 
serve the amount of individual stock ownership for all respondents. in Column 2, the ﬁnancial literacy control variable is re-
placed with self-assessed stock market knowledge instead
of the number of correct answers on the ﬁnancial literacy
questions). Aside from these changes, the regressions are
identical to those in Table 4. 
Consistent with the Heath and Tversky (1991) compe-
tence hypothesis, Table 8 shows that the effect of ambigu-
ity aversion is always more statistically signiﬁcant in the
subset of respondents reporting low stock market compe-
tence. For both measures of stock market competence, a
stronger negative relation exists between ambiguity aver-
sion and participation for individuals with lower compe-
tence. For example, the results in Column 2 imply that a
one standard deviation increase in ambiguity aversion is
associated with a 4.6 percentage point decrease in stock
market participation for an individual with low stock mar-
ket competence, compared with an insigniﬁcant 1.2 per-
centage point decrease for an individual with high stock
market competence. However, the difference in the effect
of ambiguity aversion between the high and low compe-
tence groups is not statistically signiﬁcantly, so we cannot
conclude that the effect of ambiguity aversion is different
for the low and high competence groups. 
6.2. Ambiguity aversion, stock market competence, and 
portfolio under-diversiﬁcation 
Conditional on stock market participation, many house-
holds hold equity portfolios that are extremely under-
diversiﬁed relative to mean-variance eﬃcient benchmarks
( Blume and Friend, 1975; Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008;
Polkovnichenko, 2005 ). The theoretical model of Boyle,
Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang (2012) suggests that ambiguity
aversion can explain this puzzle. In their model, portfoliodiversiﬁcation is determined by the relative ambiguity of
the overall market versus that of a few undiversiﬁed, but
potentially familiar, stocks. An investor who is ambiguity-
averse, and who views the overall market as more am-
biguous than the familiar stocks, will hold an undiversiﬁed
portfolio of familiar stocks. An ambiguity-averse investor
who views the overall market as highly ambiguous, and
does not view any individual stocks as familiar, will not
participate at all. An ambiguity-averse investor who does
not view the overall market as highly ambiguous will hold
a diversiﬁed portfolio. In this subsection, we test these pre-
dictions using our two measures of stock market compe-
tence (self-assessed stock market knowledge and ﬁnancial
literacy) as measures of investors’ perceived ambiguity of
the overall stock market. We then test whether the inter-
action of ambiguity aversion and perceived ambiguity can
help explain the portfolio under-diversiﬁcation puzzle. 
Table 9 presents the results. As our goal is to examine
allocations of equity owners, we limit the sample to only
those who participate in the stock market. In Columns 1–
3, we report probit estimates of models in which the de-
pendent variable is equal to one for respondents who own
individual stocks and zero otherwise. In Columns 4–6, we
report estimates from a Tobit model in which the depen-
dent variable is the fraction of equity allocated to indi-
vidual stocks. 21 We include both speciﬁcations for com-
pleteness but focus our discussion on the Tobit results,
as Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (20 07, 20 09 ) present evi-
dence suggesting that the proportion of equity held in in-
dividual stocks is a reasonable proxy for portfolio under-
diversiﬁcation. Furthermore, the median individual stock
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Table 9 
Ambiguity aversion and under-diversiﬁcation. 
This table shows results for regressions in which the dependent variables indicate ownership of individual stocks. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show 
probit regression results in which the dependent variable equals one if the respondent reports ownership of individual stocks. Columns 
4, 5, and 6 show Tobit regression results in which the dependent variable is the fraction of equity invested in individual stocks. Columns 
1 and 4 include no interaction term between stock market competence and Ambiguity Aversion ( AA ). Columns 2 and 5 include interaction 
terms between the level of self-assessed stock market knowledge and Ambiguity Aversion, and Columns 3 and 6 include interaction terms 
between the level of ﬁnancial literacy and Ambiguity Aversion . Respondents have low literacy if their answer to one or more of the three 
ﬁnancial literacy questions is wrong. Respondents have low knowledge if they answer “very low” to the question: “How would you rate 
your knowledge about the stock market?” All models include a constant term and controls for age, age-squared, male, white, Hispanic, 
married, (ln) number of children (plus one), health, education, employment status, (ln) family income, wealth, participation in deﬁned 
contribution or deﬁned beneﬁt plans, ﬁnancial literacy, trust, risk aversion, question order, check question score, and missing data dummies. 
The independent variables are standardized to facilitate interpretation. The table reports marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered by 
household and appear in brackets. ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Individual stock ownership Fraction of equity in individual stocks 
No Self-assessed stock Financial No Self-assessed stock Financial 
interaction market knowledge literacy interaction market knowledge literacy 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ambiguity Aversion −0 .087 ∗∗∗ −0 .115 ∗∗∗
[0 .02] [0 .01] 
AA : low stock market competence −0 .017 −0 .044 0 .459 ∗∗∗ 0 .105 ∗∗∗
[0 .06] [0 .04] [0 .04] [0 .02] 
AA : high stock market competence −0 .096 ∗∗∗ −0 .100 ∗∗∗ −0 .134 ∗∗∗ −0 .171 ∗∗∗
[0 .02] [0 .03] [0 .01] [0 .01] 
Stock market competence −0 .011 0 .063 −0 .037 0 .051 −0 .048 0 .043 
[0 .03] [0 .07] [0 .05] [0 .04] [0 .07] [0 .06] 
Controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 701 701 701 319 319 319 owner in our sample owns only two stocks, and over 86% 
hold fewer than eight stocks. Our measures of individual 
stock ownership do not include foreign stocks or own- 
company stock. The measures of stock market competence 
pertain to knowledge about stocks in general (i.e., about 
the overall market), but we lack measures of whether there 
are certain “familiar” stocks available to the individual (and 
if such a measure were available, reverse causality would 
be a concern). 
Results in Columns 1 and 4, in which we do not con- 
sider stock market competence, show a signiﬁcant nega- 
tive relation between ambiguity aversion and ownership 
of individual stocks. A one standard deviation increase in 
an individual’s ambiguity aversion implies a 8.7 percent- 
age point reduction in the probability that an equity owner 
holds individual stocks (12.7% relative to the baseline rate 
of 68.5 percentage points) and implies a 11.5 percentage 
point lower portfolio allocation to individual stocks (27.3% 
relative to the conditional average allocation of 42.2 per- 
centage points). The theoretical direction of the effect of 
ambiguity aversion is conditional on the relative perceived 
ambiguity of the overall market versus that of individual 
stocks. The negative relation that we ﬁnd implies that, in 
aggregate, investors perceive that the returns of individual 
stocks have greater ambiguity than the returns of the over- 
all market. 
In Columns 2 and 5, we split the sample based on self- 
assessed stock market knowledge, and in Columns 3 and 6, 
we split the sample based on correct answers to the ﬁnan- 
cial literacy questions. Consistent with the model of Boyle, 
Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang (2012) , a negative relation ex- 
ists between ambiguity aversion and individual stock own- 
ership for investors who do not view the overall market as 
highly ambiguous. Although theory predicts a positive rela- 
tion between ambiguity aversion and under-diversiﬁcation for investors who view the market as highly ambiguous, in 
the probit regressions the relation is not signiﬁcant. 
The Tobit regression results in Columns 5 and 6 pro- 
vide the strongest evidence supporting ambiguity aversion 
as an explanation for under-diversiﬁcation. A negative re- 
lation exists between ambiguity aversion and the fraction 
of equity allocated to individual stocks for investors with 
high stock market knowledge, but a positive relation for in- 
vestors with low stock market knowledge. Consistent with 
the predictions of theory, conditional on stock market par- 
ticipation, people who are ambiguity-averse and who view 
the overall market as highly ambiguous hold highly under- 
diversiﬁed portfolios. For this group, the results in Col- 
umn 5 imply that a one standard deviation increase in am- 
biguity aversion implies a 45.9 percentage point increase 
in the fraction of equity allocated to individual stocks. In 
contrast, those who are ambiguity-averse but do not view 
the overall market as highly ambiguous allocate little to 
individual stocks. For this group, a one standard devia- 
tion increase in ambiguity aversion implies a 13.4 per- 
centage point decrease in the fraction of equity allocated 
to individual stocks. Similar to the results for home-bias 
and own-company stock ownership, these results are di- 
rectionally inconsistent with the possibility that our mea- 
sure of ambiguity aversion inadvertently measures risk 
aversion. Risk aversion would imply a negative relation 
with portfolio under-diversiﬁcation, regardless of stock 
market competence. 
For the low stock market knowledge results, the appar- 
ent inconsistency between the probit and Tobit regressions 
is due to the bimodal nature of individual stock owner- 
ship. In general, either investors allocate a small fraction 
of their total equity holdings to a few individual stocks 
or they allocate all of their equity to a few individual 
stocks. Hence, the dummy variable indicating ownership of 
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Table 10 
Ambiguity aversion and reactions to the ﬁnancial crisis. 
This table shows results for a probit regression in which the depen- 
dent variable equals one if the respondent actively sold equities during 
the ﬁnancial crisis (20 08–20 09). The sample includes only those who 
owned equities prior to the crisis. The model includes a constant term 
and controls for age, age-squared, male, white, Hispanic, married, (ln) 
number of children (plus one), health, education, employment status, 
(ln) family income, wealth, participation in deﬁned contribution or de- 
ﬁned beneﬁt plans, ﬁnancial literacy, trust, risk aversion, question or- 
der, check question score, and missing data dummies. The independent 
variables are standardized to facilitate interpretation. The table reports 
marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered by household and appear 
in brackets. ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% lev- 
els, respectively. 
Model (1) 
Ambiguity Aversion 0 .045 ∗∗∗
[0 .01] 
Controls and constant Yes 
N 524 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 individual stocks is not a good proxy for diversiﬁcation, as
it mixes well-diversiﬁed investors who hold a few indi-
vidual stocks on top of mutual funds with very undiversi-
ﬁed investors. Investors with high ambiguity aversion and
low competence tend to invest all of their equity in a few
stocks (conditional on participation). 
Overall, then, the results support the argument
that ambiguity aversion relates to portfolio under-
diversiﬁcation but highlight the complexity of this relation,
as the effect of ambiguity aversion depends on the relative
ambiguity of the overall market versus individual stocks. 
7. Ambiguity aversion and investor behavior during the 
ﬁnancial crisis 
In this section, we test how ambiguity aversion relates
to investors’ reactions to the ﬁnancial crisis of 20 08–20 09.
The theoretical model of Mele and Sangiorgi (2013) shows
that ambiguity aversion can cause investors to exit the
stock market when the perceived level of ambiguity in-
creases, which in turn causes large changes in prices. Sev-
eral authors suggest that perceived ambiguity increased
sharply during the ﬁnancial crisis (e.g., Bernanke, 2010; Ca-
ballero and Simsek, 2013 ). Accordingly, we test whether,
conditional on owning equities before the ﬁnancial cri-
sis, individuals with higher ambiguity aversion were more
likely to actively sell equities during the ﬁnancial crisis.
These tests are conceptually different from those in the
prior sections. Rather than testing the cross-sectional rela-
tion between ambiguity aversion and ownership, here we
test whether ambiguity aversion can explain differential
responses to changes in aggregate uncertainty. 
The dependent variable in Table 10 is an indicator equal
to one for respondents who actively sold equities during
the ﬁnancial crisis. For respondents who both bought and
sold equities during the period October 1, 2008–May 11,
2009, we count only the respondents who sold more than
they bought. The regressions include the same control vari-
ables as in Table 4 . We report marginal effects, not coeﬃ-
cients, and standard errors are clustered by household. Our results support the idea that ambiguity aversion in-
teracts with time-varying levels of economic uncertainty:
respondents with higher ambiguity aversion were more
likely to actively reduce their equity holdings during the
ﬁnancial crisis. The estimated coeﬃcient implies that a
one standard deviation increase in ambiguity aversion is
associated with a 4.5 percentage point increase in the
probability of selling stocks (67.2% relative to the baseline
probability of 6.7 percentage points). Our results compli-
ment the studies on time-varying uncertainty and asset
prices by showing that, following an increase in perceived
uncertainty, variation in ambiguity aversion can explain
cross-sectional differences in portfolio changes. 
8. Comment on asset pricing implications 
Although our paper focuses mainly on portfolio choice,
it is natural to ask what could be the asset pricing implica-
tions of ambiguity aversion. A substantive, mostly theoret-
ical, literature examines the effect of ambiguity attitudes
on equilibrium asset prices (e.g., Anderson, Ghysels, and
Juergens, 2009; Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, and
Zame, 2010; Ju and Miao, 2012 ), suggesting that ambiguity-
averse agents potentially choose more conservative alloca-
tions resulting in an ambiguity premium. In our survey,
we ﬁnd strong heterogeneity in ambiguity attitudes in the
US population, with 52% being ambiguity-averse and 38%
ambiguity-seeking. Such heterogeneity could moderate the
effect on asset prices, as ambiguity-averse and ambiguity-
seeking agents’ demands for securities with ambiguous
payoffs are often opposite and can offset each other. Fur-
thermore, in our ALP survey, people with high ﬁnancial lit-
eracy own about 90% of all ﬁnancial wealth, although they
comprise only half the sample. Given that in Table 8 the
relation between ambiguity aversion and stock market par-
ticipation is not signiﬁcant for the ﬁnancially literate, this
could dampen the effect of ambiguity aversion on the eq-
uity premium. 
To explore the potential effect of ambiguity attitudes on
the equity premium, we use our survey results to calibrate
the asset pricing model of Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guar-
naschelli, and Zame (2010) . The details of this analysis are
in Online Appendix D. Relative to a benchmark expected
utility economy with an ambiguity-neutral representative
agent, our full sample ambiguity aversion estimates sug-
gest an increase in the equity premium of 0.3 percent-
age points (heterogeneous agents) to 0.5 percentage points
(representative ambiguity-averse agent). When consider-
ing only respondents who made no errors on the check
questions, the increase in the equity premium is larger,
1.2 percentage points compared with the benchmark, as
the proportion of ambiguity-averse subjects is higher in
this sample. This is by no means a thorough analysis of the
potential asset pricing implications. Instead, it is intended
to be suggestive of the possible effect on equilibrium asset
prices given the ambiguity attitudes revealed in our survey.
9. Conclusion 
Using real incentives, we measure ambiguity aversion
in a large representative survey of the US population and
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 test how ambiguity aversion relates to household portfolio 
choice. We ﬁnd that most Americans are ambiguity-averse, 
yet there is substantial variation in ambiguity preferences. 
Our analysis shows that ambiguity aversion can help to 
explain ﬁve household portfolio choice puzzles: nonpar- 
ticipation, low fractional portfolio allocations to equities, 
home-bias, own-company stock ownership, and portfolio 
under-diversiﬁcation. 
We show that ambiguity aversion is negatively associ- 
ated with stock market participation and with the frac- 
tion of ﬁnancial assets allocated to equities, consistent 
with a large theoretical literature. Our results are robust 
to controlling for many other factors that previous stud- 
ies use to explain household portfolio choice. In addition, 
and consistent with theory, we ﬁnd that ambiguity aver- 
sion is negatively associated with foreign stock ownership, 
even among stock market participants, and positively asso- 
ciated with own-company stock ownership. Furthermore, 
we show that the relation between ambiguity aversion and 
household portfolio choice patterns is stronger for respon- 
dents with lower self-assessed stock market knowledge, 
consistent with the competence hypothesis. The interac- 
tion of ambiguity aversion and stock market knowledge 
helps explain the empirically observed fact of household 
portfolio under-diversiﬁcation. We also ﬁnd that, condi- 
tional on holding stocks prior to the recent ﬁnancial cri- 
sis, more ambiguity-averse households were more likely to 
actively sell equities during the crisis. Our ﬁndings sug- 
gest that policies designed to increase ﬁnancial literacy and 
stock market competence could improve ﬁnancial decision- 
making, in part by reducing the effect of ambiguity 
aversion. 
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